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Investment timing with xed and proportional costs of
external nancing
Michi NISHIHARAy, Takashi SHIBATAz
Abstract
We develop a dynamic model in which a rm exercises an option to expand production
with cash balance and costly external funds. While related papers explain their results
only by numerical examples, we analytically prove the following results. In the presence of
only a proportional cost of external nancing, the rm with more cash balance invests ear-
lier; however, the presence of both proportional and xed costs leads to a non-monotonic
relation between the investment time and cash balance. The rm with more cash bal-
ance invests later to save a xed cost, particularly when the cash balance is close to the
investment cost. Our results can potentially account for a variety of empirical results
concerning the relation between investment volume and nancing constraints.
JEL Classications Code: G13; G31; G32.
Keywords: Real options; investment timing; costly external nancing; growth option;
optimal stopping.
1 Introduction
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that nancing and investment decisions can be made
independently in a frictionless market. Since their seminal work, a wide range of literature
has focused on investigating nancing and investment decisions in the presence of various
frictions.1 Recently, an increasing number of papers have analyzed investment timing
decisions under nancial frictions in the real options framework.2
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1An incomplete list includes Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991),
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2For example, the literature examined the e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This paper investigates an investment timing decision with costs of external nancing
in the following model. A rm owns an option to expand the scale of production by a xed
rate, where the price of the output follows a stochastic process. The investment project is
nanced with cash balance and costly external funds. The cash balance gradually increases
as the rm's existent production generates cash ows even before its expansion. If the
rm waits for a sucient level of cash balance, the project can be nanced entirely with
the cash balance. Otherwise, the rm must rely partially on costly external nancing.
Considering the trade-o, the rm determines the optimal nancing and investment policy.
As in the standard real options literature (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), our model
assumes the irreversibility and indivisibility of investing as frictions. In addition, our
model includes costs of external nancing. The nancing costs are regarded as one of
the most inuential frictions (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), Hennessy and Whited
(2007)). According to the pecking order hypothesis, asymmetric information problems
associated with external funding generate higher costs; therefore, managers prefer internal
over external nance (Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984)). We examine the case with
only a proportional cost and the case with both xed and proportional costs. The former
approximates investment by a large rm, whereas the latter approximates investment by
a small rm (Hennessy and Whited (2007)).
Before describing the results, we emphasize that our results are analytically proved.
Most of the related papers explain their results only by numerical examples for the reason
that the complexity of the models precludes analytic results (e.g., Boyle and Guthrie
(2003), Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a), Shibata and Nishihara (2012)). However, it
is more important to derive analytic results in more complicated models; the complexity
increases the possibility of computational errors and makes the parameter sensitivity
unclear. In this paper, unlike related papers, we analytically prove interesting properties
of the rm's optimal nancing and investment policy by employing similar techniques
to those developed in the mathematical nance literature (e.g., Broadie and Detemple
(1997), Detemple (2006)). This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating how
to derive analytic results.
The results are summarized as follows. Costs of external nancing reduce the option
value and discourage the investment compared with the case with no nancing costs.
This result is consistent with the standard view from empirical and theoretical studies
concerning costly external nancing (e.g., Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007)). When
costs of external nancing are relatively low to the scale of the prot expansion, the rm
may invest partially with external nancing. Otherwise, the rm always waits until the
cash balance reaches the investment cost so that the project can be nanced entirely
with internal funds. In this case, the rm receives a higher prot from saving costs of
Schurho (2011)), manager-shareholders-debtholders conicts (Shibata and Nishihara (2010)), and debt ca-
pacities (Shibata and Nishihara (2012)).
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external nancing than a loss due to the distortion in investment timing. We derive a
clear condition that forces the rm to invest entirely with internal funds. The condition
is more likely to be satised in a situation involving a smaller-scale expansion, a lower
investment cost, higher nancing costs, a smaller rm, and more cash balance.
Whether there is a xed cost of external nancing greatly aects the relation between
the investment time and cash balance. First, we explain the result in the case with only
a proportional cost. In the absence of xed cost, the rm with more cash balance invests
earlier. The reasoning is as follows. An increase in the cash balance decreases the nancing
cost proportionally; hence, it decreases the threshold price above which the rm expands
production partially with external nancing. This monotonic relation is straightforwardly
consistent with the classical view of underinvestment due to nancing constraints (e.g.,
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hubbard (1998)). In this view, a rm's invest-
ment volume has a monotonic relation with internal funds. This paper complements the
literature by analytically proving that, in the presence of only a proportional cost, more
internal funds accelerate investments in a dynamic model.3
Now, we consider the case with both xed and proportional costs. A xed cost, unlike
a proportional cost, plays a role in discouraging the investment by the rm with more
cash balance. The intuition is as follows. An increase in the cash balance decreases the
time until the cash balance reaches the investment cost. With a shorter waiting time, the
rm with more cash balance can invest entirely with internal funds and save a xed cost.
This xed cost eect is opposite to the proportional cost eect described in the previous
paragraph. The trade-o between the two eects determines the relation between the
investment time and cash balance. We derive the result that the rm with more cash
invests later if the cash balance is close to the investment cost. This non-monotonic
relation is inconsistent with the conventional view of underinvestment due to nancing
constraints. However, our result can potentially explains empirical results against the
conventional view (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007)) in
terms of xed and proportional costs of external nancing.
The result is also consistent with recent papers in the real options literature. Boyle and
Guthrie (2003) showed that a rm with less cash balance may invest earlier to avoid the
risk of a cash shortfall. In their model, a liquidity constraint, rather than nancing costs,
plays a role in leading the non-monotonic relation.4 Shibata and Nishihara (2012) concen-
trated on a debt capacity constraint instead of internal nancing constraints and showed
that investment thresholds have a U-shaped relation with a debt capacity constraint.
Note that these related papers demonstrate the results only in numerical examples. We
complement the literature by analytically proving the non-monotonic relation between
3Milne and Robertson (1996) showed that investment increases with cash holdings in a dynamic dividend
and investment model. In the real options literature, Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a) and Nishihara and
Shibata (2010) also showed that the investment threshold decreases with internal funds.
4Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003) to a case with nancing costs.
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the investment time and cash balance due to xed and proportional costs of external
nancing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup and
the result in the case without nancing costs. Section 3 presents the results in the cases
with only a proportional cost as well as both xed and proportional costs. Although the
price is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion, we discuss how the results can be
extended in the case of geometric Levy process. Section 4 presents numerical examples and
examines the comparative statics with respect to the price volatility. Section 5 concludes
the paper. All proofs appear in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Setup
Consider a risk-neutral rm that produces a commodity at a constant rate. The output
is sold at the market price X(t), which follows a geometric Brownian motion
dX(t) = X(t)dt+ X(t)dB(t) (t > 0); X(0) = x; (1)
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion dened in a probability space (
;F ;P)
and ; (> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. For convergence, we assume that r > , where
r is a positive constant interest rate. Assume that the rm owns an option to expand
production to the xed scale A(> 1) at any time. If the option is exercised at time  , the
rm pays a xed cost at time  and receives an instantaneous cash ow AX(t) after time
 . Assume that the investment cost is I(> 0) if the whole amount of the cost is internally
nanced. If part of the investment cost is externally nanced, the rm pays a proportional
cost C( 0) and a xed cost K( 0) of external nancing. The total investment cost is
expressed as I + Cmax(I   Y (); 0) +K1fY ()<Ig, where Y () denotes cash balance at
time  . Until the investment time  , cash balance Y (t) follows
dY (t) = rY (t)dt+X(t)dt; (0 < t < ) Y (0) = y; (2)
where y( 0) is a constant. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) assume dynamics of cash balance
exogenously and consider an option to initiate a new project. In contrast, we relate cash
balance Y (t) to operating cash ows X(t) more directly and consider the option to expand
production. In the case of C = 0 and K = 0, the setup corresponds to a standard model
of the growth option. For a comprehensive list of typical situations tting the standard
model, refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Although the standard model presumes that
the rm needs no costs of external nancing (otherwise, it has sucient internal funds),
our model considers xed and proportional costs of external nancing. Unlike Boyle and
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Guthrie (2003), who concentrated on a liquidity constraint,5 we examine the eects of
nancing costs on optimal investment timing.
Our assumption of costly external nancing is justied as follows. In the pecking
order theory, a variety of agency and asymmetric information problems increase costs of
external nancing, which leads to a preference for internal over external nance (Myers
(1984), Myers and Majluf (1984)). Practically, nancing costs consist of a xed cost
(which is independent of the issue size) and a variable cost (which depends on the issue
size). A xed cost includes taxes, fees, and setup expenses. A variable cost increases with
the issue size primarily because more underwriting services are required for more funds
raised. In the standard view of the literature, a variable cost is convex with respect to the
issue size (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)). Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimated
that proportional costs of equity nancing are approximately 5% (10%) for large (small)
rms. They argued that a signicant level of xed costs of equity nancing may exist
only for small rms, while the convexity is statistically insignicant for any rms. In
considering their results, as well as preserving tractability of the model, we examine two
cases: the case with only a proportional cost (Section 3.1) and the case with both xed
and proportional costs (Section 3.2).
2.2 Case with no nancing costs
As a benchmark, this section briey describes the case of C = K = 0. The rm solves
the following problem:
sup
2T
Ex[
Z 
0
e rtX(t)dt+
Z 1

e rtX(t)dt  e rI]; (3)
where T denotes the set of all stopping times and Ex[] denotes the expectation conditional
on X(0) = x. In (3),  represents the time to expand the scale of production. By the
strong Markov property of X(t), (3) can be easily reduced to
x
r    + sup2T E
x[e r

A  1
r   X()  I

]| {z }
=:V0;0(x) the growth option value
;
where we denote the second term by V0;0(x). The standard argument (e.g., Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)) proves that
V0;0(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:

(A  1)x0;0
r      I
 
x
x0;0
!
(0 < x < x0;0)
(A  1)x
r      I (x  x

0;0);
(4)
5Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003) by considering both a liquidity
constraint and nancing costs.
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where  := 1=2   =2 +p(=2   1=2)2 + 2r=2(> 1) is a positive characteristic root,
and x0;0 := (r )I=f(A 1)( 1)g is the threshold price above which the rm expands
production.
3 Analytic Results
3.1 Case with a proportional cost
This subsection examines the case of C > 0 and K = 0. This assumption applies to
investments by large rms (Hennessy and Whited (2007)). In this case, the growth option
value, denoted by VC;0(x; y), is expressed as
VC;0(x; y) = sup
2T
Ex;y[e r

A  1
r   X()  I   Cmax(I   Y (); 0)

]; (5)
where where Ex;y[] denotes the expectation conditional on (X(0); Y (0)) = (x; y). The
term Cmax(I Y (); 0) means that a proportional cost is required when the rm is short
of cash balance. The standard argument proves that the exercise region of the option is
expressed as
SC;0 := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = (A  1)x=(r   )x  I   Cmax(I   y; 0)g: (6)
Now we analytically prove interesting properties of VC;0(x; y) and SC;0.
Consider the following problems as approximations of VC;0(x; y):
VU (x; y) := sup
2T
Ex;y[e r

A  1
r   X()  I   C(I   Y ())

]; (7)
and
VL(x; y) := sup
2T
Ex[e r

A  1
r   X()  I   C(I   y)

]: (8)
By the strong Markov property of X(t), we can easily derive the closed-form solution of
(7) as follows: If A  C   1 > 0, we have
VU (x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
C

y +
x
r   

+

(A  1  C)xU
r      (1 + C)I

x
xU

(0 < x1 < x

U )
(A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y) (x1  x

U );
(9)
where xU := (r  )(1 +C)I=f(   1)(A C   1)g represents the threshold price above
which the rm expands production. Otherwise, VU (x; y) = C(x=(r   ) + y) holds and
the growth option will be never exercised. Note that in both cases the exercise policy is
independent of Y (t). In (8), VL(x; y) is the same as (4) replaced I with I + C(I   y).
Then, the threshold price, denoted by xL(y), is equal to
xL(y) =
(r   )(I + C(I   y))
(   1)(A  1) : (10)
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First, we show several properties of the option value VC;0(x; y). The following propo-
sition shows that VL(x; y) and VU (x; y) are closed-form bounds of VC;0(x; y).
Proposition 1 If y < I, VL(x; y)  VC;0(x; y)  VU (x; y) is satised. Otherwise,
VC;0(x; y) = V0;0(x; y) holds.
Next, we show several properties of the exercise region SC;0. It immediately follows
from Proposition 1 that SC;0 includes SI which is dened by
SI := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x  x0;0; y  Ig: (11)
Then, we examine the properties of TC;0 := SC;0 n SI . We can show the following lemma
and proposition.
Lemma 1
Assume that A  C   1 > 0. It holds that
0 VC;0(x+; y)  VC;0(x; y)  (A  1)
r    (12)
0 VC;0(x; y +)  VC;0(x; y)  C (13)
for any positive constant .
Proposition 2
Case (a): A  C   1 > 0
The exercise region SC;0 is the disjoint union of SI and
TC;0 = f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x  xC;0(y); y < Ig; (14)
where xC;0() is a continuous and decreasing function satisfying
xL(y)  xC;0(y)  xU (15)
and
lim
y"I
xC;0(y) = max

x0;0;
(C + 1)rI
A  C   1

(16)
Case (b): A  C   1  0
The exercise region SC;0 is equal to SI , which means that TC;0 = ;.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates the exercise region in each case.6 Note that the exercise region is
connected. The rm's nancing and investment policy can be classied into two dierent
types, depending on the relation between the scale of production expansion, A   1, and
6In all gures in this paper, we set the axes in the same way as Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Hirth and
Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) for comparison.
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a proportional cost of external nancing, C. Consider Case (a) in which a proportional
cost is relatively low. The rm invests partially with external nancing when the output
price, X(t), exceeds the threshold xC;0(Y (t)). Proposition 2 shows a monotonicity in the
threshold xC;0(Y (t)) with respect to cash balance Y (t). The reason is as follows. An
increase in Y (t) decreases a nancing cost, C(I   Y (t)), which enables the rm to invest
earlier. Accordingly, the presence of the proportional cost of external nancing leads to a
straightforward result that the rm with more cash balance invests earlier.
In Case (b), the rm always waits until the cash balance reaches the whole amount of
the investment cost. The reasoning is as follows. As long as Y (t) < I, the rm receives
cost savings of CX(t)dt + r(1 + C)Idt and loses (A   1)X(t)dt by deferring investment
by an innitesimally short period dt. If A C   1  0, we have CX(t)dt+ r(1+C)Idt 
(A 1)X(t)dt > 0 for any X(t), which means that the cost saving eect always dominates
the loss. Then, the rm has no incentive to invest with external nancing. Below, we
describe major determinants of entirely internal nancing. Clearly, low nancing costs and
much cash balance are the determinants. Since a small rm suers from relatively higher
nancing costs (Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007)), a small rm is more likely to invest
entirely with internal nancing compared with a large rm. In addition, a small-scale
expansion with low investment cost increases the possibility of entirely internal nancing.
For example, suppose that C = 0:1. While a large-scale investment with A = 1:5 and
I = 100 leads to Case (a), a small-scale investment with A = 1:1 and I = 20 leads to Case
(b).
It should be noted that we, unlike most of the related papers, analytically prove the
existence of continuous and decreasing thresholds xC;0(Y (t)). It is worth deriving the
analytic results in a complicated problem involving multiple state variables because the
complexity increases the possibility of computational errors. Although some of the tech-
niques used in the proof are enlightened by the mathematical nance literature (e.g.,
Broadie and Detemple (1997), Detemple (2006)), the proofs are newly developed in this
paper. While the mathematical nance studies analyzed the exercise regions of American
options that involve a multi-dimensional geometric Brownian motion7, the stochastic pro-
cess Y (t) in our model is not a geometric Brownian motion; instead, it is but dened by
(2). Furthermore, the payo function of problem (5) is not convex, which makes the proofs
more dicult. This paper contributes to the literature from this technical viewpoint.
Proposition 2 shows that nancing costs of external nancing discourage the invest-
ment compared with the case with no nancing costs. This is consistent with empirical
results (e.g., Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007)). The monotonic relation between the
investment time and cash balance is consistent with the conventional view of underinvest-
ment due to nancing constraints. Indeed, many empirical and theoretical papers have
shown that a rm with less internal funds invests less than a rm with sucient internal
7Nishihara (2011) showed the properties of multiple real options using similar techniques.
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funds (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hubbard (1998)). Milne and Robert-
son (1996) examined a rm's dynamic policy of dividend and investment; they showed
that the investment level increases with cash holdings. Similar results are seen in the real
options literature. Nishihara and Shibata (2010) showed that a rm delays the investment
when it must rely more heavily on debt nancing than the optimal level of the leverage.
Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a) showed that the investment threshold is decreasing in
the rm's liquid funds.
On the other hand, empirical ndings against the monotonic relation between the
investment volume and internal funds have been identied (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), Moyen (2004), Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007)). These studies have shown that
having more internal funds does not necessarily increase the investment level. In the next
section, we will show that the inclusion of a xed cost of external nancing can lead to
the non-monotonic relation between the investment time and cash balance.
3.2 Case with xed and proportional costs
This section examines the case of C > 0 and K > 0. In this case, the option value,
denoted by VC;K(x; y), is expressed as
VC;K(x; y) = sup
2T
Ex;y[e r

A  1
r   X()  I   Cmax(I   Y (); 0) K1fY ()<Ig

];
(17)
where 1fY ()<Ig denotes the dening function. Note that the exercise region of the option
is
SC;K := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j VC;K(x; y) = (A 1)x=(r ) I Cmax(I y; 0) K1fy<Igg: (18)
We can readily show the following proposition regarding the properties of VC;K(x; y).
Proposition 3 VC;0(x; y)  K  VC;K(x; y)  VC;0(x; y) is satised. If A   C   1  0,
VC;K(x; y) = VC;0(x; y) is satised. If y  I, VC;K(x; y) = V0;0(x; y) is satised.
Next, we analytically prove the properties of the exercise region SC;0. Proposition 3
shows that SC;0 includes SI . Then, we concentrate on the properties of TC;K := SC;K nSI .
Proposition 4
Case (a-K): A  C  K=I   1 > 0
The exercise region SC;K is the disjoint union of SI and TC;K satisfying
TC;K  TC;0 \ R+  [0; I  K=(A  C   1)); (19)
and
f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x  xC+K=(I y);0(y); y < I  K=(A  C   1)g  TC;K ; (20)
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where xC+K=(I y);0(y) denotes the threshold of problem (5) replaced C with C+K=(I y).
In particular, there exist (x; y1) 2 SC;K ; (x; y2) =2 SC;K , and (x; y3) 2 SC;K satisfying
y1 < y2 < y3.
Case (b-K): A  C  K=I   1  0
The exercise region is equal to SI .
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 illustrates the exercise region in each case. The rm defers the investment so
that the project can be nanced entirely with internal funds if costs of external nancing
are suciently high (Case (b-K)). Otherwise, the rm may invest partially with costly
external nancing (Case (a-K)). A xed cost K > 0 increases the possibility of Case (b-K)
by the additional term K=I and discourages the investment, compared with the case with
only a proportional cost. Similar to the case with only a proportional cost, a smaller-scale
expansion, a lower investment cost, higher nancing costs, a smaller rm, and more cash
balance increase the possibility that the rm invests entirely with internal nancing.
Below we explain Case (a-K) in which a xed cost of external nancing generates
quite a dierent result from that of Case (a) in Proposition 2. The key result is that
R+  [I   K=(A   C   1); I) is not included in the exercise region SC;K . Before cash
balance, Y (t), reaches the critical level, I K=(A C 1), the rm may expand the scale
of production for a suciently high price of the output. Once the cash balance reaches
the critical level prior to the investment, the rm always defers the investment until the
cash balance is equal to the whole amount of the investment cost.
A xed cost provides a greater incentive for the rm with more cash balance to wait
and invest entirely with internal funds. Indeed, the rm with more cash balance can save
a xed cost with a shorter deferment of the investment. On the other hand, there always
exists the proportional cost eect; an increase in cash balance reduces a proportional
cost of nancing and increases the incentive to invest earlier. The two conicting eects
determine the relation between the investment time and cash balance. Proposition 4 shows
that the xed cost eect dominates the proportional cost eect when the cash balance is
suciently close to the investment cost. Consequently, contrary to the conventional view
(or the result in the case with only a proportional cost), the rm with more cash balance
invests later in the situation. As easily seen, the xed cost eect is weak when the cash
balance is far from the investment cost. Thus, the presence of both xed and proportional
costs leads to the non-monotonic relation between the investment time and cash balance.
Proposition 4 has the potential to explain the non-monotonic relation observed in
empirical studies (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007)), in
terms of xed and proportional costs of external nancing. This result is also consistent
with the following ndings in the real options literature.8, Boyle and Guthrie (2003)
8Apart from dynamic investment models, Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007) showed both theoretically and
empirically a U-shaped relation between the investment level and internal funds.
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showed that a rm with less cash balance may invest earlier to avoid the risk of a cash
shortfall. In their model, investment is possible only when a liquidity constraint is satised.
The liquidity constraint leads to a V-shaped relation between the investment threshold
and cash balance. Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003)
to a case involving nancing costs and showed the possibility of a variety of relations.
Shibata and Nishihara (2012) showed that, in a dynamic investment and capital structure
model, investment thresholds have a U-shaped relation with a debt issuance constraint.
Although these papers explain their results only by numerical examples, we analytically
prove the non-monotonic relation between the investment time and cash balance.
3.3 The output price following a geometric Levy process
The results obtained in the previous subsections hold true when the output price follows a
geometric Brownian motion, as well as when it follows a geometric Levy process. The class
of geometric Levy processes, unlike a geometric Brownian motion, includes processes with
jumps and can account for fat tails and skewness of probability distributions of the output
price. Assume that the output price X(t) := xeZ(t), where Z(t) is a Levy process (i.e.,
a process with stationary independent increments), satises the convergence condition:
E1[X(t)] = et with  < r. In the case with no nancing costs, the results are seen in
Boyarchenko (2004). Although the problem precludes a closed-form solution of V0;0(x) and
x0;0, we still obtain an investment threshold as proved in Mordecki (2002). A diculty in
extending the results in the previous subsections to the case of a geometric Levy process
is that the generating operator of (X(t); Y (t)) includes the integrals corresponding to
the jumps (refer to (ksendal and Sulem 2007)). However, we obtain the same relation,
Lf(x; y)  rf(x; y)  0, x  (C +1)rI=(A C   1), as in the case with no jumps using
the linearity of f(x; y) dened by (23). As a result, we can trace all the proofs of the
lemma and propositions in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. All technical details are omitted.
4 Numerical examples
As mentioned in Section 1, the main contribution of this paper is to analytically prove the
properties of the rm's optimal nancing and investment policy (Section 3). This section
supplements the analytic results by presenting the comparative statics results with respect
to the volatility  in numerical examples. The base parameter values except for  are set
as follows:
r = 0:07;  = 0:03; I = 100; (X(0); Y (0)) = (10; 50); A = 1:5; C = 0:1;K = 1: (21)
Cases (a) and (a-K) are satised because A   C   K=I   1 = 0:39 > 0 hold. In the
computation, we make a tri-nomial lattice model that approximates to a a geometric
Brownian motion (1), and we use a value function iteration algorithm.
11
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 plots the exercise regions with varying levels of  in the cases with only a
proportional cost and with both xed and proportional costs. We can see from Figure
3 that a higher  decreases the exercise regions in both cases. This implies that the
investment threshold and the option value increase with . Thus, the eect of the volatility
 on the investment policy remains unchanged from that of the standard model with no
nancing costs. In the upper panel of Figure 3, there is a gap between limy"I xC;0(y) =
(C + 1)rI=(A   C   1) and x0;0 for  = 0:1; 0:15, whereas limy"I xC;0(y) is equal to x0;0
for  = 0:2; 0:25; 0:3. Since x0;0 is increasing with , a higher  reduces a gap between
limy"I xC;0(y) and x

0;0 (cf. Propostion 2). In the lower panel of Figure 3, the boundary
of TC;K has an asymptote y = I  K=(A C   1). As proved in Propostion 4, the option
is not exercised for Y (t) 2 [0; I  K=(A  C   1)).
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated a rm's option to expand the scale of production by a xed rate.
We assumed that the project is nanced with cash balance, which is increasing with time,
and external funds that may require proportional and xed costs. We, unlike most of
the related papers, analytically proved the properties of the rm's optimal nancing and
investment policy. The results are summarized as follows.
Costs of external nancing reduce the option value and discourage the investment
compared with the case with no nancing costs. When costs of external nancing are
relatively low to the scale of the prot expansion, the rm may invest partially with
external nancing. Otherwise, the rm always waits until the cash balance reaches the
investment cost so that the project can be nanced entirely with internal funds. The
entirely internal nancing is likely to be adopted in a small-scale expansion by a small
rm with more cash balance. In the presence of only a proportional cost, the rm with
more cash balance invests earlier; however, the presence of both proportional and xed
costs leads to a non-monotonic relation between the investment time and cash balance.
Our results can potentially account for ambiguous results in empirical studies regarding
the relation between investment volume and nancing constraints.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Since Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial value y, we have for y < I
I   Y (t)  max(I   Y (t); 0)  I   y
at any time t. This implies that VL(x; y)  VC;0(x; y)  VU (x; y) holds for y < I. Clearly
we have VC;0(x; y) = V0;0(x; y) for y > I.
B Proof of Lemma 1
First, we show (12). Note that E1[] represents the expectation with X(t) starting from
X(0) = 1. For any positive constant , we have
VC;0(x+; y)
= sup
2T
E1[e r

(A  1)(x+)
r    X()  I   Cmax(I   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)(x+)X(s)ds; 0)

]
 sup
2T
E1[e r

(A  1)x
r    X()  I   Cmax(I   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)xX(s)ds; 0)
+
(A  1)
r    X() + C
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds

]
 sup
2T
E1[e r

(A  1)x
r    X()  I   Cmax(I   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)xX(s)ds; 0)

]| {z }
=VC;0(x;y)
+ sup
2T
E1[e r

(A  1)
r    X() + C
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds

]
=VC;0(x; y) + sup
2T
E1[e r

(A  1)
r    X()

+ C
Z 1
0
e rsX(s)ds 
Z 1

e rsX(s)ds

]
=VC;0(x; y) +
C
r    +
(A  1  C)
r    sup2T E
1[e rX()]| {z }
=1
(22)
=VC;0(x; y) +
(A  1)
r    ;
where in (22) sup2T E1[e rX()] = 1 follows from  < r.
Next, we show (13). For any positive constant , we have
VC;0(x; y +)
= sup
2T
Ex[e r

(A  1)
r    X()  I   Cmax(I   e
r (y + 
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds; 0)

]
 sup
2T
Ex[e r

(A  1)
r    X()  I   Cmax(I   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds; 0) + erC

]
= sup
2T
Ex[e r

(A  1)
r    X()  I   Cmax(I   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds; 0)

]| {z }
=VC;0(x;y)
+C
=VC;0(x; y) + C:
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C Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider the case of A   C   1 > 0. Fix (x; y) 2 TC;0 and (x0; y0) satisfying x  x0
and y  y0 < I. Using Lemma 1, we have
VC;0(x
0; y0) = VC;0(x0; y0)  VC;0(x; y0) + VC;0(x; y0)  VC;0(x; y) + VC;0(x; y)
 (A  1)(x
0   x)
r    + C(y
0   y) + VC;0(x; y)
=
(A  1)(x0   x)
r    + C(y
0   y) + (A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y)
=
(A  1)x0
r      I   C(I   y
0);
where the last inequality implies (x0; y0) 2 TC;0. This proves that TC;0 is expressed as (14)
with the decreasing function xC;0(). By Proposition 1, we immediately obtain inequality
(15).
Next, we will show (16). Clearly we have limy"I xC;0(y)  x0;0. Denote the payo
function of problem (7) as
f(x; y) :=
(A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y): (23)
We have
Lf(x; y)  rf(x; y)  0
,(A  1)x
r    + C(x+ ry)  r

(A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y)

 0
,x  (C + 1)rI
A  C   1 ; (24)
where L denotes the generating operator of (X(t); Y (t)). Since the general theory of
optimal stopping ensures LVC;0(x; y)   rVC;0(x; y)  0 (refer to Peskir and Shiryaev
(2006)), by (24) f(x; y) is not equal to VC;0(x; y) for x < (C + 1)rI=(A   C   1) and
y < I. In other words, the option is not exercised in the region f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x <
(C + 1)rI=(A C   1); y < Ig. This proves that limy"I xC;0(y)  (C + 1)rI=(A C   1).
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
Now, suppose that (C + 1)rI=(A   C   1)  x0;0 < limy"I xC;0(y) (see Figure 4).
We can lead to contradiction as follows. Consider problem (7) with a nite maturity T .
Generally, the exercise region of an American option converges to the region Lf   rf  0,
where L is the generating operator and f is the payo function, when the remaining
life of the option goes to zero (refer to Detemple (2006)). Then, because of (24), the
exercise region of problem (7) with a nite maturity T converges to f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x 
(C + 1)rI=(A   C   1)g when T # 0. Consider the exercise region of problem (5) for
a xed x satisfying x0;0 < x < limy"I xC;0(y) and y " I. Note that I := infft  0 j
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X(t)  x0;0; Y (t)  Ig converges to 0 as y " I. Accordingly, the exercise region of the
problem (5) for the xed x and y " I converges to that of problem (7) with T # 0. This
implies that limy"I xC;0(y) = (C + 1)rI=(A   C   1), which contradicts the assumption
of (C + 1)rI=(A   C   1) < limy"I xC;0(y). Similarly we can lead to contradiction if
x0;0 < (C + 1)rI=(A  C   1) < limy"I xC;0(y) is supposed. Thus, we complete the proof
of (16).
We can show the continuity of xC;0() as follows. By Lemma 1 we have the continuity of
VC;0(x; y). Since VC;0(x; y) and (A  1)x=r     I Cmax(I y; 0) are both continuous,
SC;0 is a closed set. Then, we have lim#0(xC;0(y + ); y + ) 2 SC;0, which leads to
lim#0 xC;0(y + )  xC;0(y). We have lim#0 xC;0(y + )  xC;0(y) because xC;0() is
decreasing. Thus, we obtain the right-continuity of xC;0(). Now, suppose that there
exists y(< I) satisfying xC;0(y) < lim#0 x

C;0(y   ). We can lead to contradiction as
the same method as the proof of (16). Consider the exercise region of problem (5) for
a xed x satisfying xC;0(y) < x < lim#0 x

C;0(y   ) and y   . Note that infft  0 j
X(t)  xC;0(Y (t))g converges to 0 as  # 0. Then, the exercise region converges to that
of problem (7) with T # 0. This implies that lim#0 xC;0(y   ) = (C + 1)rI=(A  C   1),
which contradicts (C + 1)rI=(A C   1)  xC;0(y) < lim#0 xC;0(y   ). Thus, we obtain
the left-continuity of xC;0().
Lastly, consider the case of A  C   1  0. In this case, we have for any (x; y) 2 R2+
Lf(x; y)  rf(x; y) =  (A  C   1)x+ (C + 1)rI > 0;
where L is the generating operator of (X(t); Y (t)) and f(x; y) is dened by (23). Since
LVC;0(x; y) rVC;0(x; y)  0 holds by the general theory of optimal stopping, f(x; y) does
not agree with VC;0(x; y). This implies that TC;0 = ; and SC;0 = SI .
D Proof of Proposition 3
By 0  K1fY (t)<Ig  K we have VC;0(x; y) K  VC;K(x; y)  VC;0(x; y). Suppose that
A  C   1  0. It follows from Proposition 2 and the optimality of VC;K(x; y) that
VC;0(x; y) = Ex;y[e rI

A  1
r   X(I)  I

] (25)
 VC;K(x; y); (26)
where I denotes the rst hitting time to SI = f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x  x0;0; y  Ig. Then, we
obtain VC;0(x; y) = VC;K(x; y). Clearly we have VC;K(x; y) = V0;0(x; y) for y  I.
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E Proof of Proposition 4
First, suppose that A C  K=I   1 > 0. By Proposition 3 we have for any (x; y) 2 TC;K
VC;0(x; y)  VC;K(x; y) +K
=
(A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y) K +K
=
(A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y);
where the last inequality implies (x; y) 2 TC;0. This proves that TC;K  TC;0.
Fix any (x; y) 2 R2+ satisfying I  K=(A  C   1)  y < I. Consider the rst hitting
time to SI , denoted by I . Since Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial point
Y (0) = y, we have
VC;K(x; y)  sup
2T
Ex;y[e r

A  1
r   X()  I  

C +
K
I   y

max(I   Y (); 0)

]| {z }
=VC+K=(I y);0(x;y)
= Ex;y[e rI

A  1
r   X(I)  I

] (27)
 VC;K(x; y);
where by Proposition 2 we have (27) because of A   C   K=(I   y)   1  0. The last
inequality implies that (x; y) =2 TC;K , which leads to TC;K  R+ [0; I  K=(A C   1)).
This completes the proof of (19).
Next, x any (x; y) 2 R2+ satisfying x  xC+K=(I y);0(y) and y < I  K=(A  1  C).
Since Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial point Y (0) = y, we have
VC;K(x; y)  sup
2T
Ex;y[e r

A  1
r   X()  I  

C +
K
I   y

max(I   Y (); 0)

]| {z }
=VC+K=(I y);0(x;y)
;
=
(A  1)x
r      I  

C +
K
I   y

(I   y)
=
(A  1)x
r      I   C(I   y) K;
where the last inequality implies (x; y) 2 TC;K , and, therefore, we obtain (20).
Lastly, consider the case of A  C  K=I   1  0. We use the same technique as the
proof of (19). Fix any (x; y) 2 R2+ satisfying y < I and denote by I the rst hitting time
to SI . Because Y (t)  0 holds for any time t, we have
VC;K(x; y)  sup
2T
Ex;y[e r

A  1
r   X()  I  

C +
K
I

max(I   Y (); 0)

]| {z }
=VC+K=I;0(x;y)
=Ex;y[e rI

A  1
r   X(I)  I

] (28)
VC;K(x; y);
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where by Proposition 2 we have (28) because of A C K=I  1  0. The last inequality
proves that (x; y) =2 TC;K , and, then, we have TC;K = ; and SC;K = SI .
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Figure 1: The exercise region in the case with only a proportional cost. The upper panel
illustrates Case (a) satisfying x0;0  (C + 1)rI=(A C   1). The middle panel illustrates Case
(a) satisfying x0;0 < (C + 1)rI=(A   C   1). In this case, there is a gap between limy"I xL(y)
and x0;0. The lower panel illustrates Case (b).
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Figure 2: The exercise region in the case with both xed and proportional costs. The upper
panel illustrates Case (a-K). The lower panel illustrates Case (b-K).
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Figure 3: The comparative statics with respect to the volatility . The upper and lower
panels illustrate the cases with only a proportional cost and both xed and proportional costs,
respectively. The parameter values other than  are set at the base case (21).
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Figure 4: The assumption of x0;0 < limy"I x

C;0(y). The dot represents the initial point (x; y)
satisfying x0;0 < x < limy"I x

C;0(y) and y  I.
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